In his recent book The Lockerbie Bombing: The Search for Justice, Kenny MacAskill recounts his decision to release Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi, the only man convicted of the Lockerbie bombing. Eight years have passed since AlMegrahi's release on compassionate grounds. In the book MacAskill ranges far beyond the events in which he was closely involved, recounting the bombing itself, the subsequent investigation, trial and appeals in an effort to offer a comprehensive account of the Lockerbie bombing. In this article I review the book and return to some of the key issues raised by MacAskill's decision and the broader context in which it was made. I argue that the book sheds little new light on Lockerbie and that it falls short in precisely the areas where MacAskill might have the most insight to offer. It is a rather bloodless and legalistic account that renders the complexities and the shades of grey of international politics in black and white. The case will nevertheless remain fascinating to scholars of intergovernmental relations in the UK, of paradiplomacy, and of international politics.
Introduction
Mr al-Megrahi now faces a sentence imposed by a higher power. It is one that no court, in any jurisdiction, in any land, could revoke or overrule. It is terminal, final and irrevocable. He is going to die. In Scotland, we are a people who pride ourselves on our humanity. It is viewed as a defining characteristic of Scotland and the Scottish people … Our justice system demands that judgment be imposed but compassion be available. Our beliefs dictate that justice be served, but mercy be shown … For these reasons -and these reasons alone -it is my decision that Mr Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi, convicted in 2001 for the Lockerbie bombing, now terminally ill with prostate cancer, be released on compassionate grounds and allowed to return to Libya to die (Scottish Government, 2009 ). aftermath of the decision, voices of opposition dominated, with MacAskill facing criticism both at home and abroad. The initial response from US political leaders was unfavourable, perhaps unsurprisingly given that 189 of the 270 victims were US citizens (Guardian, 2009 ). Closer to home, opposition parties in the Scottish Parliament heaped criticism onto MacAskill (Scottish Parliament, 2009a; and the Scottish public was divided (Channel 4 News, 2009 ).
In the years since, the UK and Scottish governments have released a significant amount of official documentation, with fragments appearing courtesy of WikiLeaks.
David Cameron ordered an inquiry by the then Cabinet Secretary, Sir Gus O'Donnell, into the events surrounding the decision (UK Government, 2011) . Al-Megrahi died not within three months of his release, but nearly three years later in Tripoli.
Questions continue to be asked about the bombing, the trial of Al-Megrahi and the evidence that led to his conviction, and who, ultimately, was responsible for ordering the bombing of the plane. In July 2017 Al-Megrahi's family lodged a fresh appeal in an attempt to clear his name (BBC, 2017) . The case will not go away. And nor should it. Whilst this article does not intend to probe the various theories, claims, and counter-claims about who ultimately was responsible and what role Al-Megrahi had in the events, significant questions and significant doubt still hang over the history of Lockerbie.
The prompt for this article is MacAskill's book, published in May 2016. The book is an in-depth account by the now retired MSP of his decision to release Al-Megrahi.
But it goes beyond that, exploring events leading to the bombing, the subsequent investigation, trial and appeal, and the relationship between the West and Libya.
This article is intended as a critical review of MacAskill's book and draws on earlier research (Kenealy 2012a; 2012b) . The overarching argument is that MacAskill fails to shed much new light on the events surrounding Lockerbie. Furthermore, it is about those events that he is uniquely placed to comment on that he is most cautious, offering little beyond what he made clear at the time in his statements and media appearances. When stepping back to consider the arena of international politics on which the Lockerbie drama played out, MacAskill offers an overly black-and-white, legalistic and moralistic analysis devoid of any nuanced discussion about the type of hard choices that define that arena. 
The Road to 2007
I am principally concerned in this article with the events between June 2007 and August 2009, when the UK, Scottish, Libyan and US governments were intertwined in a complicated diplomatic process. However, to understand those events some context is necessary. The Boeing 747 was en route from London to New York's JFK airport. A bomb planted in the baggage compartment brought down the aircraft. Just less than three years later, and following a protracted investigation, two Libyans -Al-Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah -were indicted. Libya continued to deny involvement or knowledge of the bombing. 4 For nearly seven years efforts were underway to secure the extradition of the two suspects. Negotiations were also required to agree a format and a location for any subsequent trial. In the meantime Libya felt the pressure of UN Security Council resolutions 748 and 883, which placed various 4 Letter from the Permanent Rep. of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 17 November 1991, at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/46/660. sanctions on Libya, its regime, assets, and officials, particularly inhibiting Libya's oil sector.
By August 1998 agreement had been reached to try the suspects at Camp Zeist, in the Netherlands, under Scottish law. The UK and the US had agreed to this and lodged a letter with the UN on 24 August 1998 stating that 'if found guilty, the two accused will serve their sentence in the United Kingdom', a letter that was to take on much significance as MacAskill deliberated in 2008-2009. 5 In parallel to these legal developments, a process of rehabilitating Libya and bringing it back into the fold of international society was underway. In part, Gaddafi 5 Letter from the Acting Permanent Reps. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/1998/795, 24 August 1998, at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1998/795. 6 The SCCRC is an independent, public body established in 1999 to review alleged miscarriages of justice in Scotland. It can refer to the High Court of Justiciary any conviction or sentence whether or not an appeal has been previously heard. Section 194C of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 states that the SCCRC may refer a case where it believes that '(a) a miscarriage of justice may have occurred; and (b) it is in the interests of justice that a reference should be made'. 7 The suitcase containing the bomb that brought down Pan-Am 103 originated in Malta, according to the best evidence. It was transported from Malta to Frankfurt on an Air Malta flight and then placed, along with other unaccompanied baggage, in a container and on to the first leg of Pam Am 103, from Frankfurt to Heathrow and then transferred to the transatlantic leg of the flight, from Heathrow to JFK.
himself drove that process: with sanctions taking their toll on Libya, he saw a need to re-engage with the West (Suskind, 2003) . Turning over Al-Megrahi and Fhimah was part of that process, even though it brought risks for Gaddafi on the home front, given that Al-Megrahi was a prominent member of the Megarha tribe on whose support Gaddafi depended to maintain order in Libya (Porter, 2010, p. 3). Baker (2013, pp. 262-63) documents how George W. Bush and Tony Blair pursued Gaddafi's offer of renouncing his weapons and missile programmes and becoming an ally of the West in the post-9/11 Global War on Terror. For both the Bush and Blair administrations, Gaddafi's coming in from the cold was 'an important victory … because it took a potentially erratic nuclear player off the board' and offered the two leaders a good PR story in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq (Ibid., pp. 301-2). As the relationship between Libya and the West started to thaw, a race began amongst Western governments and companies to secure access to Libya and various trade and commercial concessions (Kenealy 2012b, pp. 558-60) . The EU moved quickly, having engaged cautiously with Libya throughout the 1990s (Zoubir, 2009b) . The US moved more slowly to normalise relations (Zoubir, 2006) . Following the 9/11 attacks, the focus of US security 'concentrated ever more on the Maghreb, and a continuation of sanctions and the bellicosity of the Bush Administration provided leverage that saw Qaddafi abandon' his weapons programmes (Kenealy 2012b, p. 558; see Zoubir, 2009a, p. 995; Zoubir, 2006, pp. 63-5) .
The UK government was closely involved with this rapprochement. From 2000 various contacts at official level took place to prepare the ground for the lifting of sanctions on Libya and the commercial opportunities that would follow (Merrick, 2009 MacAskill sets out his thesis early on:
[The book] shows that the trial and the subsequent legal wranglings were in some ways a side issue to major international, commercial and security deals … I knew at the time that Scotland was just a small cog in a big wheel, but what I did not realise then was just how small and how big (TLB, p. 8).
That is nothing particularly new. Press reports, long read journalistic pieces, academic articles, and books by participants have detailed those realities. To be fair, 303). This threading together of Iran, the PFLP-GC, Syria and Libya is interesting. The major problem is that the section is so thinly referenced because there is a lack of hard evidence to support it. This is not speculation about political motivation, where the problem of a lack of evidence is common. It is speculation about who commissioned a terrorist attack, who made bombs and procured timers, and who delivered them.
And within all of this, what was the role of Al-Megrahi? MacAskill offers his opinion that, whilst involved in the Lockerbie plot, Al-Megrahi di not acquire the clothes in Malta (TLB, p. 305) and, whilst he likely took the suitcase with the bomb in it to the airport in Malta, 'it was Fhimah would get it airside and beyond security' (TLB, p. 312) . This is, to say the least, a remarkable admission to make given that AlMegrahi's guilty verdict was so heavily based on the notion that he was the purchaser of the clothes, a point quickly pointed out by John Ashton, who worked on Al-Megrahi's legal team (Ashton, 2016) .
The second web is the web that surrounded the release of Al-Megrahi. It is here that MacAskill criticises the broader foreign policy agenda that saw various Western countries and companies rushing to cut deals, do business, and secure concessions and contracts in Libya, usually having to deal with Gaddafi's officials as part of that process. As with his recapping of the bombing and the trial there is little new in this content. It is, by now, well established that BP lobbied the UK government to help them progress their exploration deal in Libya. And it is also well established that the Lord Falconer, at the time the Lord Chancellor in the UK government, defended the failure to consult with Scottish ministers on the grounds that the MoU was just the first step of a process of negotiation and 'does not commit the Scottish Executive [as it was formally called at the time] or indeed the UK Government to anything specific'. 10 Jack Straw, Falconer' successor as Lord Chancellor and a key player in subsequent developments, reiterated this distinction between the MoU as a 'broad outline' of 'the aspirations you wish to achieve' and the PTA which involved getting 'down to the detail' (House of Commons, 2010, qq. 153, 155) .
MacAskill is right, IGR did not function well during these early stages of the process (TLB, . Although the concordats are said to be binding in honour only, the UK government failed to communicate and consult fully, to co-operate in these early stages of policy development, and to fully exchange information in the spirit of no surprises (Kenealy, 2012a, pp. 70-73) . It is also important to note that this failure cannot be attributed to any desire, on the part of the UK government, to withhold information about UK foreign policy from an SNP government. The UK was discussing the MoU with Libya for some time before the SNP's victory in the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections. As such it was the Labour First Minister Jack
McConnell that UK ministers were keeping in the dark. McConnell was quick to criticise UK ministers for this once news of the MoU became public (BBC, 2007) . The most intelligible way to read the UK government's decision to progress the MoU with consulting Scottish ministers is that they wished to set a process in train, a process that would begin to generate its own momentum, before Scottish ministers could begin to publicly challenge them.
From that point on, however, IGR were better. There were three decisions taken between 2007 and 2009 that involved IGR. The first two were decisions of the UK government: the first to sign the MoU (discussed above and a failure of IGR) and the second to sign the PTA. The third decision was by the Scottish government, to decline the request to transfer Al-Megrahi. IGR did not perform equally badly across these three decisions although in none of the three cases can they be said to be exemplary.
The decision by the UK government to sign the PTA on 17 November 2008, without any specific provision excluding Al-Megrahi, was the culmination of a threecornered negotiation in which UK officials shuttled backward and forward trying to accommodate the interests of the Libyan and Scottish governments. MacAskill is highly critical of this decision, complaining that the UK government reneged on commitments to Scotland to ensure that the PTA would not cover Al-Megrahi or anybody convicted in connection with Lockerbie (TLB, pp. 170-80). Jack Straw did write to MacAskill explaining that the preference of the UK government was for Al-Megrahi to be excluded from the terms of the PTA and officials from the UK's Ministry of Justice negotiated with that aim in mind. 11 Straw stressed to MacAskill that he would instruct his officials to attempt to amend the PTA, making it 'clear to the Libyan authorities that without this addition it will not be possible to conclude' a PTA. 12 It was at this stage that the national interest of the UK government -to pursue its rapprochement with Libya and to reap a share of the benefits of any opening up of Libya economically -came into direct conflict with the commitment given to the decision by the UK government was made in the national interest and a submission to Jack Straw on 7 November 2007 sets out the balance of interests. 15 The biggest criticism that could be levelled against the decision was not that the UK government failed to allow Scottish ministers a veto over UK foreign policy but rather that UK ministers seemed to be adopting an incredibly short-term, kick-thecan-down-the-road approach to their bilateral relationship with Libya. Signing the PTA, as the Libyans requested, might have given some short-term respite. Indeed BP's exploration deal was ratified just days after the PTA was signed. However, if Throughout the book MacAskill makes it clear that he was operating in a complex, high stakes environment with political considerations swirling. He details being caught between the interests of the UK, Libya, and the US and of being aware of all manner of potential political fallouts on all sides (TLB, . He maintains, as of course he must, that he took the decision in a quasi-judicial way, more akin to a judge than a politician. The broader political context was, he claims, not a factor. To say that beggars belief is no indictment of MacAskill. Rather it is an indictment of the fanciful notion that human beings who have ascended to the top of politics can suddenly flick a switch, move into a vacuum, and take a decision in a detached and legalistic way. It is part of a broader shift towards the idea that we can de-politicise or technocratise processes and decisions that are shot through with politics. he had to be released on compassionate grounds they would prefer than he be released to a secure residence in Scotland, something MacAskill has discounted on logistical grounds. 22 MacAskill was caught between the interests of three governments. And hanging over it all was the knowledge that Libyan regime had a track record of engaging in retaliatory measures against countries that displeased it.
One of the most telling moments in the book comes when MacAskill writes:
Just a few weeks before, UK hostages taken prisoner in Iraq had been murdered. That had followed the execution prior to that of other Western nationals captured in the area. There was hostility to the West and ordinary citizens were becoming targets. Most in North Africa or the wider Arab world neither knew of Scotland nor cared about it … The last thing I wanted was to have Scotland become a place that was demonised and its citizens targeted. I would not allow Scottish oil workers or others, wherever they might be, to face retribution as a consequence of my decision (TLB, p. 170).
The words resonate because they reveal MacAskill to be a human being making a tough decision in an environment where such serious issues as potential retaliation against Scottish citizens had to be considered. Some of the government papers that have been released to date remain redacted but it seems plausible that some 21 Record meeting between Libyan government officials and Scottish government officials, 27 October 2008, SG. Libyan official relay to him that it would be easier to grant compassionate release if he dropped his outstanding appeals (see Ashton, 2012) . No evidence has emerged to substantiate this claim. It is, nevertheless, disappointing that the meeting is described so briefly in the book.
It is also disappointing that MacAskill offers no real explanation for why both decisions were announced at the same time. Al-Megrahi dropped his outstanding appeals two days before 20 August. Let us assume that he did so simply to hedge his bets and ensure that both his applications -for transfer and for compassionate 23 See note 3.
release -had a chance of succeeding (no transfer could be granted so long as there were outstanding appeals). MacAskill has given, as his reason for rejecting the transfer request, the commitments in the August 1998 UK-US letter. He was in possession of all the information he was going to get on that front by 6 August when the letter arrived from the Foreign Office. He received the medical report with the three-month prognosis on 10 August. The sequencing and timing are certainly tight but if there is any truth to the notion that Scottish ministers wanted Al-Megrahi's appeals to be dropped then events proceeded in the best way possible to achieve that end. This meeting, no doubt crucial in terms of the presentation and framing of the decision, is another one that is glossed over quickly. Yet the way in which the Scottish government framed and presented the compassionate release is one of the most fascinating aspects of the history of Lockerbie. It is unlikely that many records exist of discussions that would have taken place at these most senior political levels.
For those who, Geoffrey Elton-like, seek a history of empirically verifiable facts, the notion that the Scottish government found a way to make the best of a bad situation by turning the release of Al-Megrahi into an opportunity will be beyond the scope of inquiry. But the decision to release Al-Megrahi compassionately and, crucially, the way that decision was presented and the language used can be understood as a case of political para-diplomacy (Kenealy, 2012b) . Para-diplomacy is a concept that has emerged in academia to try to make sense of the external affairs activities of sub-national governments. Over the past 20-or-so years a cottage industry has emerged at the interface of Comparative Politics and International Relations seeking to explain the phenomenon (see Aldecoa and Keating, 1999) . Scholars of para-diplomacy most often focus on economic and cultural activities by sub-national governments, such as trade missions, sporting events, tourism, and national heritage. However, it is also possible to engage in political para-diplomacy. In the case of the SNP, who seek independence for Scotland, political para-diplomacy would involve taking advantage of opportunities to act internationally so as 'to demonstrate, and project the image' of a Scotland 'with its own set of values, laws, and customs, and possessing an ability to operate autonomously on the international stage' (Kenealy, 2012b, p. 556) Nothing in the documents published to date suggests that the Scottish government, or MacAskill himself, made the decision with these calculations in mind. But to seek that standard is to return to a political history that admits no interpretation that cannot be empirically verified by a documentary source. But the task of the political historian is to try and reconstruct the decision dynamics. Others might reasonably look at the above options in a slightly different way. Of the options on the table the one that the Scottish government were most able to control, the one that they were most able to paint as distinctively 'Scottish', and the one that closed the door to an ongoing appeal, was the one that emerged.
Conclusion
Churchill apparently once said, 'history will be kind to me, for I intend to write it'. In the case of the decision to release Al-Megrahi, MacAskill is the first person involved in the process to put pen to paper extensively. What he has presented is a book that is ultimately unsatisfying. As a critique of the West's policy towards Libya during the 1990s and 2000s it is shallow and opts for the easy critique. As an attempt to play the role of detective surrounding the Lockerbie bombing it pieces together an explanation that is plausible but not new. And as an insight into the events of 2007-2009, events that MacAskill was a part of, it adds very little to the existing record.
The world that MacAskill creates is one in which he and his SNP colleagues are the only pure politicians in a world of reprehensible dirty dealers, from Blair to Bush and beyond. Whilst it is in the interests of all (ex)-politicians to preserve their legacy there is a balance to be struck between respectability and insight. In seeking to preserve the former, MacAskill has fallen short on the latter.
More remains to be written about Lockerbie. Whilst some documents have been released, and they are useful, others remain classified. Papers on the UK government's approach to Libya will begin to emerge in a few years as a result of the shift from the 30-year rule to a 20-year rule. Scottish government papers from 2007-2009 should start to appear from 2022. US documents will come even later. For those interested in the events surrounding Lockerbie -from the bombing to the release of Al-Megrahi -there will be more paper trails to follow. As time passes and more of the participants retire or die it may be possible for more candid research interviews to be undertaken. Perhaps there might even be a few more memoirs. And with an appeal ongoing, one thing is certain: Lockerbie is not going away any time soon. 
